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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the past decades, the labour market consequences of the international integration 
process have been at the centre of hot debate. Anti-globalisation protests surrounding the 
WTO, IMF and World Bank meetings reveal that many people fear that they will lose their 
job or will be confronted with lower wages because of the threat of fiercer international 
competition.  
One strand of the literature, investigating the impact of international trade on the labour 
market has taken its outset in the integration of emerging economies. Compared to OECD 
countries, these countries have a relative large supply of unskilled workers with low wages. 
Accordingly, it has been a concern whether the position of unskilled versus skilled workers in 
OECD countries would deteriorate. This could show up either in lower relative wages and/or 
higher unemployment for these unskilled workers. 
One favourite framework of trade economists to study the impact of international trade on 
the labour market, is the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory (HOS) in which the Stolper-
Samuelson (SS) theorem is an important building block. According to this theorem, the 
relative (real) wages of unskilled workers in OECD countries decline if the integration 
process is associated with a decline in relative prices of commodities using a lot of unskilled 
labour. However, a voluminous literature linking changes in product prices to changes in 
factor prices (see Slaughter, 2000, for a survey of these studies) has found that international 
trade can account for only a very small fraction of the deterioration of the position of 
unskilled workers. Instead, technological progress seems to be the main reason for observed 
relative wage changes.  
Labour economists have mainly used the so-called Factor Content of Trade (FCT) 
approach. In this approach, the amount of labour (eventually split-up between skilled and 
unskilled workers) embodied in a country’s exports and imports is calculated. Subsequently, 
these changes in labour flows are linked to labour demand elasticities in order to calculate the 
impact of international trade on wages. Except for Wood (1994), most authors also find a 
small to moderate impact of international trade on worker’s wages. 
The studies mentioned above focus on factor revenues and do not address the capture or 
distribution of rents in response to international trade. A growing body of the trade-labour 
literature has relied on rent-sharing models to explain changes in wages by changes in rents in 
response to openness. In rent-sharing models, workers no longer obtain the competitive wage 
but are able to capture a fraction of the firm's profits per worker in the form of higher wages. 
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Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada, Borjas and Ramey (1995) for the US and Kramarz 
(2003) for France show how increased international competition triggers a shift in the rents 
from domestic to foreign firms. This leads to a change in profits of the domestic firm, which 
translates into wages changes in the domestic market. Fontagné and Mirza (2001) focus on 
trade volumes to address the international rent-sharing hypothesis in developed and 
developing countries. Their empirical results show that an increase in exports as well as 
domestic market shares induces higher wages in a number of industries in the OECD. In 
developing countries, such as the Mediterranean countries and those in Latin America, similar 
rent-sharing effects are observed. However, these effects are not present in Asia. 
 In this paper, we also rely on a rent-sharing framework to investigate the impact of 
international trade on labour market outcomes in Belgium. We argue that there are at least 
two valid reasons for doing so. First, Belgium is one of the most open economies in the world. 
More specifically, the export/GDP ratio equals 85% in 2002 compared to 10% in the US. 1 
Krugman (1995) among others argues that globalisation cannot explain US labour market 
developments because the US economy is just not open enough for trade to matter a lot. 
Turning this argument around, we expect significant labour market effects from trade in 
Belgium. Second, the Belgian economy is characterised by the presence of wage negotiations 
between firms and their workers at the national, the sectoral and the firm level. Hence, this 
makes a rent-sharing framework very valid to explain wages in the Belgian economy.  
 In this paper, we focus on two issues. In the first part of the paper, we focus on the 
effect of international trade through changes in the firms’ rents. To our knowledge, this issue 
has not been taken up for the Belgian economy. Veugelers (1987) and Goos and Konings 
(2001) examine the rent-sharing hypothesis with Belgian firm data and find a positive profit-
wage relationship. However, these authors do not relate their rent-sharing framework to a 
story of globalisation. Following Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada, which like Belgium 
is a typical example of a small open economy, we also use import and export prices in our 
analysis. However, we also experiment with other measures, such as exchange rates, to test 
whether increased globalisation has affected wages through changes in the firms’ rents.  
Whereas the studies mentioned above and our first part of this paper analyse the effect 
of globalisation through the size of the rents, we focus explicitly on the distribution of the rents 
in the second part of this paper. As pointed out by Rodrik (1997), increased international 
competition has led to a lower share of the enterprise surplus ending up with workers. A 
                                                
1 The data are obtained from the OECD International Trade Statistics and the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators (see http:/ / www.oecd.org) 
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related consequence is that unions have become weaker. In other words, lower wages in the 
case of increased international competition are not only induced by a decline in the firm’s 
rents, but can also be the result of the union’s lower bargaining power. In this paper, we 
therefore study whether the globalisation process has influenced the nature of bargaining 
between workers and employees. Within this framework, we explicitly test whether in sectors 
characterised by strong international product market competition (measured by variables 
related to e.g. export and import competition, outsourcing, tariffs and foreign direct 
investment), workers/unions will have less bargaining power during wage negotiations. 
Indirect empirical evidence for weaker unions is given by the study of Slaughter 
(2001) who investigates the hypothesis that trade liberalisation has contributed to increased 
labour demand elasticities. Using sectoral-level data, his empirical results are mixed and show 
that mainly time effects determine changes in labour demand elasticities of especially 
unskilled workers. However, a number of trade-related variables (such as outsourcing, net 
exports, etc.) are found to have the predicted effect on the labour demand elasticity of both 
production and non-production workers. As pointed out by Slaughter (2001) and Rodrik 
(1997), finding increased labour demand elasticities in the case of increased foreign 
competition could be consistent with a story of a shift from labour towards capital bargaining 
power over rent distribution in firms enjoying extra-normal profits. 
Budd and Slaughter (2003) focus on Canada and investigate whether profits are shared 
across international borders. More specifically, Canadian wages are regressed on Canadian 
and US profits, both interacted with several variables related to international linkages such as 
multinational ownership, union type and tariffs and transportation costs. The empirical results 
regarding the profits of Canadian firms reveal that rent-sharing is less present when the 
Canadian firm is part of a US multinational and/or international union. When the Canadian 
profits are interacted with Canadian tariffs on US imports and transportation costs, the results 
reveal that higher Canadian profits are related to higher wages but there is no variation in 
rent-sharing across tariff levels and transport costs. In this paper, we further investigate 
whether increased globalisation has indeed an effect on the workers’ bargaining power.  
Veugelers and Konings et al. (2000) for Belgium and Svejnar (1986) for the US 
(1989) point out that there is indeed a lot of cross- industry variation in the relative bargaining 
power coefficient. Svejnar and Veugelers further investigate the determinants of this cross-
industry variation of the bargaining power coefficient. Although a well-developed theory of 
these determinants of relative bargaining power is lacking, these authors link the sectoral 
bargaining power parameters to variables relating to the economic bargaining environment 
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such as the consumer price index, the sectoral unemployment rates and several variables 
capturing output market concentration. However, they do not relate the workers’ bargaining 
power to globalisation. More specifically, we use a two-stage approach in which we first 
estimate the workers’ (relative) bargaining approach for each sector following Veugelers 
(1987) and Svejnar (1986). With the aid of a unique data set encompassing the entire 
population of Belgian firms, we are able to split up our data into several sectors.2 In the 
second stage, we relate the workers’ (relative) bargaining power of each sector and year to a 
broad range of globalisation measures such as trade, outsourcing, tariffs and measures related 
to foreign direct investment.  
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical 
framework and also present an overview of the literature how international trade can affect 
wages in a wage bargaining framework. Section 3 presents the regression results of the first 
stage. Section 4 focuses on the determinants of the workers’ bargaining power and hence 
deals with the regression results of the second stage. The paper ends with a summary of the 
main results and points out some extensions for future work.   
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The methodology in this paper borrows from the rent-sharing literature. A lot of papers 
deal with this issue and investigate the link between a firm's ability to pay and the workers' 
wages. Within this framework, workers no longer obtain the competitive wage but are able to 
capture a fraction of the firm's profits per worker in the form of higher wages. 
In this section, we first describe the efficient bargaining framework. Then, we briefly 
discuss the three channels through which international trade can affect wages during the 
bargaining process.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Our dataset has the advantage of being a more exhaustive dataset in comparison to the Amadeus dataset 
of the Bureau van Dijck which is another firm-level database as this dataset only contains firms satisfying 
at least one of the following criteria: number of employees greater than 100, total assets and operating 
revenues exceeding 16 million and 8 million USD, respectively.  
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2.1.    Efficient bargaining framework 
 
The union and the firm are involved in an efficient bargaining procedure, with both 
real wages ( )w  and employment ( )N  as the subject of agreement (McDonald and Solow, 
1981). Relying on the Efficient Bargaining model is motivated by stylised facts about 
Belgian industrial relations, i.e. Belgian collective agreements do not only deal with 
wages but also with employment issues like hours of work and part-time labour policies 
(Bughin, 1996). Microeconomic evidence in favour of Efficient Bargaining for Belgium 
has been provided by e.g. Bughin (1993). We introduce the following Nash bargaining 
product from which we will determine the bargained wages: 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ββ pipi −−−=Ω 100
,
,, NwUNwUMax
Nw
    (1) 
with U  denoting the utility function of the union, pi  the firm’s profit, N  the firm’s labour 
demand, [ ]0 1∈β ,  represents the union’s bargaining power and 0U  and 0pi are the threat points 
of respectively the union and the firm. These threat points are the payoffs when no agreement 
is reached.  
 The union is risk neutral3 and its objective function is specified in a utilitarian form: 
( ) ( ), aU w N Nw N N w= + − , where N  is union membership ( )0 N N< ≤  and aw w≤  is the 
alternative wage (i.e. a weighted average of the alternative market wage and the 
unemployment benefit).    
The firm’s utility equals its profits pi , with ( ) ( ),w N R N w N Fpi = − − , where PQR =  
stands for total revenue ( )0"NR < , P  for the output price, Q  for output and F  for all other 
costs associated with production. For simplicity, we assume that labour is the only variable 
input for the firm. Hence, F  represents fixed costs. It can be shown that this assumption on 
the fixed nature of inputs other than labour does not affect the bargaining outcome provided 
the union preferences do not depend on those inputs (Bughin, 1996).   
The threat points refers to the payoffs in case no agreement between the workers and the 
firm is reached. The threat point for the union is assumed to be equal to the alternative wage 
aw .
4
 If no revenue accrues to the firm when negotiation breaks down, the firm’s fallback 
                                                
3 See Svejnar (1986) and Veugelers (1987) among others for the derivation of the case of a risk-averse 
union. 
4 It is not necessary for the unions’ threat point to be equal to the alternative wage (see e.g. Mc Donald 
and Suen ,1992, and Layard et al., 1991, for a discussion). Blanchflower et al. (1996) interpret the workers’ 
threat point as the wage of temporary work in case of a breakdown in bargaining. Others such as Layard 
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utility equals F− . The outcome of the bargaining of the asymmetric generalised Nash solution 
therefore reduces to: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ββ −−−−+=Ω 1
,
wNRwNwNNNwMax aaNw         (2) 
 Maximisation of equation (2) with respect to the wage rate ( )w gives the following equation: 
 
 
1a
R wN
w w
N
= +
β −  
− β    (3) 
 
Maximising equation (2) with respect to employment ( )N  leads to the following first-
order condition:  
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N
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R wN
w R
N
R N
w R
N
−
= +
−
= +
β
− β
β
   
   
  (4) 
 
From equation (4), it follows that unions extract a rent from bargaining, expressed as a 
premium over the marginal revenue of labour ( )NR . 
By solving simultaneously both first-order conditions, we obtain an expression for the 
contract curve, which results from the tangency between iso-profit curves and union 
indifference curves: N aR w= . This equation shows that the employment level depends on the 
alternative wage ( )aw  but not on the negotiated wage ( )w . It also follows that the contract 
curve outcome is to the right of the labour demand curve. The first-order condition related to 
optimal employment, equation (4) shows the extent to which the bargaining outcome is off the 
labour demand curve. 
 
2.2. Channels through which international trade affects wages in a bargaining 
framework 
Theoretically, there are three channels through which product market integration 
(globalisation) can affect wages during the bargaining process (see equation (3)). 
First, international trade can induce movements in the firm’s financial conditions pi , i.e. 
affecting the size of the rents (or the ‘pie’) that can be shared between the workers and the 
                                                                                                                                                   
et al. (1991) also refer to the threat point as the income received from strike pay or from unemployment 
benefits in case these are payable. 
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firm. Abowd and Lemieux for Canada (1993) and Kramarz (2003) for France use foreign 
competition shocks as an exogenous source of variation in product market conditions to 
identify the effect of the firm’s financial conditions on negotiated wages. The results of 
Abowd and Lemieux reveal that foreign import competition in the form of lower import or 
export prices lower both wages and quasi-rents per worker. Moreover, the effect on the quasi-
rents is larger than on the wages which implies that workers are not able to capture all the 
changes in quasi-rents induced by changes in import and export prices. Kramarz uses US 
export prices to determine the effect on (quasi)-rents and hence wages. He finds that export 
prices of US firms to OECD countries increase French quasi-rents. US export prices to 
Eastern European countries and oil-producing countries decrease French quasi-rents. Kramarz 
considers the first as a potential proof of increased import competition while the latter can be 
consistent with an increase in oil prices.  
Second, international trade can affect the bargaining outcome through movements in the 
firms’ and the workers’ threat points. Biscourp and Kramarz (2002) and Kramarz (2003) 
show how intermediate imports may act as substitutes for part of the labour input. Firms that 
use intermediate inputs in the production process have to announce the amount of imports 
well in advance. In other words, these intermediate imports can be seen as investments that 
influence the firm’s threat point and provide the workers with hold-up opportunities 
(Malcomson, 1997). More specifically, Kramarz (2003) shows that there is a positive relation 
between the firms’ intermediate imports and the workers’ wages. At the same time, imports of 
finished goods by the firm itself or by its competitors decrease the workers’ outside options 
(Kramarz, 2003). During wage negotiations, the workers have possible access to other jobs in 
case the bargaining breaks down. The availability of these temporary jobs is inversely related 
to the amount of imported finished goods in an industry (see Kramarz, 2003, p. 6, for a 
discussion).  
The empirical results of Kramarz for France reveal that increased import competition not 
only influences wages through changes in the quasi-rents but increased import competition, 
working through the workers’ threat point, has also a negative effect on the workers’ wages.  
The third channel through which international trade can influence wages using a wage 
bargaining framework is through the workers’ bargaining power parameter  . There are two 
solution concepts within the bargaining framework: the axiomatic approach and the strategic 
approach. The static axiomatic (normative) approach concentrates on the outcome of the 
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bargaining process satisfying certain principles that might be achieved by an objective 
arbitrator in case of disagreement between the parties (Booth, 1995).5 
 The dynamic game-theoretic (strategic) approach involves modelling the bargaining 
process in order to determine the actual outcome. It can be shown that in a simple ‘alternating 
offers model’ with no uncertainty, the game-theoretic solution equals the generalized Nash 
Bargaining solution (see Sutton, 1986, and Binmore et al., 1986, for an extensive comparison 
of both approaches). More specifically, the outcome of a bargain can be compared to the 
division of a continuous supply of a cake between two parties (see Layard et al., 1991, for an 
interpretation). Binmore et al. (1986) show that when two assumptions are fulfilled, the cake 
would be equally split. These assumptions are: both parties have the same discount rate and 
neither party gets any extra income from other sources while disagreement is going on.  
The real advantage of the game-theoretic approach is that an economic interpretation 
can be given to the bargaining power parameter β (see Booth, 1995). First, in models where 
parties discount the future and hence, where delay of a settlement diminishes the present value 
of the result, the workers’ bargaining power will be higher if workers have a lower discount 
rate than the employers and are hence less willing to have a disagreement.6  Reasoning in this 
way, Lindén (1995) defines β as the ratio of the hiring rate from the unemployed to the sum 
of the hiring rate and the rate of filling vacancies (and hence on the labour market tightness) 
in an equilibrium search model. The more impatient the employer or the tighter the labour 
market, the higher the bargaining strength of the union and vice versa. Therefore, measures 
related to globalisation could have an impact on the tightness on the labour market and hence 
on the unions’ bargaining power. Higher import competition (export competition) could 
decrease (increase) the workers’ bargaining power as the labour market become less (more) 
tight. Second, β can be interpreted as the ratio of the parties’ perceived risk that the other 
party will leave the bargaining table (Binmore et al., 1986, Donald and Suen, 1992, and 
Teulings and Hartog, 1998). More specifically, the unions’ and the firms bargaining power is 
related to the costs or benefits of both parties in delaying an agreement (Smith, 1996, and 
Layard et al., 1991).7  More specifically, if a bargaining partner receives extra income in case 
of a disagreement, this partner is more willing to tolerate disagreement and hence bargain for 
                                                
5 These axioms are invariance, Pareto efficiency, independence or irrelevant alternatives and anonymity or 
symmetry.  
6 Gibbons (1992, p. 68) refers to the parties’ discount rate as the time value of money as a dollar received 
at the beginning of one period and this can be put in the bank to earn interest.   
7 As discussed by Smith (1996), these costs or benefits can have an effect on the workers’ bargaining 
power through changes in their relative time preferences.  
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a higher share of the ‘pie’. In some papers (see e.g. Doiron, 1992, among others), these costs 
are interpreted as the strike costs in case the negotiating parties use strikes as a dispute 
resolution mechanism. Among others, higher inventories, more liquid assets and lower capital 
intensity positively are shown to be related to a firm’s strike costs and hence its bargaining 
power. (see e.g. Doiron, 1992, and Clark, 1991 and 1993). For workers, these strike costs 
could be related to the availability of strike funds or the availability of temporary jobs 
elsewhere. Also, other family members’ income could form an alternative in case of 
disagreement during wage negotiations and it is even the case that these members are more 
motivated to apply for more temporary employment in case of disagreement. The chance that 
the workers or other family members obtain other employment in case of a disagreement 
depends on the probability of obtaining this other employment. This probability is inversely 
related to the rate of unemployment in the economy. Therefore, a higher unemployment 
lowers the unions’ bargaining power. Other factors, such as globalisation, are therefore also 
able to affect the unions’ bargaining power as these might have an impact on the rate of 
unemployment.  
An informal theory regarding the determinants of the unions’ bargaining power is also 
given in the paper of Donald and Suen (1992). The authors argue that workers’ bargaining 
power is related to the amount of support workers are prepared to give to a wage claim. One 
factor influencing this support is the union’s leadership but it is difficult to find a statistical 
measure for this. Another factor is the workers’ feeling about the fairness of the claim. If 
workers feel that the claim is unreasonable, they are less eager to support the wage claim. In 
other words, restricting wages is felt to be important in periods of unfavourable economic 
conditions as large wage increases are considered to be dangerous to economic activity in 
general and jobs in particular. One direct indicator of the economic condition is the level of 
unemployment. It is also in this context that increased globalisation can have an impact on the 
economic situation as e.g. higher import competition (export competition) can increase 
(decrease) unemployment and hence influence unions’ bargaining power. As pointed out by 
Donald and Suen (1992), the impact of unemployment on unions’ bargaining power is not 
about the reduction in alternative job prospects or about the decline in the demand for labour 
but is instead related to the will of workers to press for a wage claim.8  
In a related context, future profits of firms confronted with increased globalisation will 
be affected. As a consequence, producers are more aggressive during wage negotiations and 
                                                
8 Donald and Suen (1992) argue that union density may be an indicator of the justness of union wage 
claims.  
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are less willing to share their rents in case their profits will be negatively affected. In case of 
increased import competition, we expect a negative link between import competition and the 
unions' bargaining power. In the case of export expansion, the opposite result holds: unions 
are more able to extract higher rents in those firms with a strong export performance as firms 
will be able to tolerate higher wage claims.  
As one of the first, Rodrik (1997) has pointed out that increased globalisation has 
lowered the workers’ bargaining power. More specifically, he argues that the more 
substitutable domestic workers are with foreign workers due to e.g. international trade, 
outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI), the lower the enterprise surplus ending up 
with workers. He also points out that as a consequence, unions have become weaker. For the 
US, Baldwin (2003) finds that between 1977 and 1997, the share of workers with median 
education who where represented by a trade union declined from 29 to 14 percent. For 
workers with above median education and with basic education, the decline has been from 19 
to 13% and from 58 to 51% respectively. However, a slight increase from 18 to 19% has been 
observed for the better-educated workers. Baldwin finds that international trade has in general 
a very small impact on the decline in unionisation, except for the decline in unionisation for 
workers with less education. Rodrik (1997) also mentions that the link between globalisation 
and the nature of bargaining between workers and employers has received little attention in 
the academic literature. Indirect empirical evidence for weaker unions is given by the study of 
Slaughter (2001) who investigates the hypothesis that trade liberalisation has contributed to 
increased labour demand elasticities. Using sectoral-level data, his empirical results are mixed 
and show that mainly time effects determine changes in labour demand elasticities. However, 
a number of trade-related variables (such as outsourcing, net exports, etc.) are found to have 
the predicted effect on the labour demand elasticity of especially non-production workers.9 As 
pointed out by Slaughter (2001) and Rodrik (1997), finding increased labour demand 
elasticities in the case of increased foreign competition could be consistent with a story of a 
shift from labour towards capital bargaining power over rent distribution in firms enjoying 
extra-normal profits.  
Work more directly related to impact of increased globalisation on workers’ bargaining 
power is the paper of Budd and Slaughter (2003). This paper focuses on Canada and 
investigates whether profits are shared across international borders. More specifically, 
Canadian wages are regressed on Canadian and US profits, both interacted with several 
                                                
9 Among others, other papers such as Krishna et al. (2001) for Chile, Bruno et al. (2002) for several 
OECD countries have also investigated this issue.  
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variables related to international linkages such as multinational ownership, union type and 
tariffs and transportation costs. The empirical results regarding the profits of Canadian firms 
reveal that rent-sharing is weaker when the Canadian firm is part of a US multinational and/or 
international union. Budd and Slaughter argue that the standard profit-sharing situation is 
tempered because of additional complexities of multinational ownership and that US parents 
might feel competitive pressure when Canadian industry profits are high and hence try to 
restrain wages. When the Canadian profits are interacted with Canadian tariffs on US imports 
and transportation costs, the results reveal that higher Canadian profits are related to higher 
wages but there is no variation in rent-sharing across tariff levels and transport costs. 
Although less relevant for the discussion of this paper, the results regarding the US profit 
levels show that higher US profits increase or have no effect on the wages of workers of firms 
of US owned multinationals and/or employees part of an international union. Furthermore, 
higher US profits in low-tariff Canadian industries lower Canadian wages but this negative 
profit effect is moderated when Canadian tariffs are higher. Furthermore, these authors do not 
find any effect for the transport costs.10  
In this paper, we further investigate the issue whether globalisation changes the unions’ 
bargaining power as first pointed out by Rodrik (1997). We use a broad range of  
globalisation measures such as trade, outsourcing, tariffs and measures related to foreign 
direct investment. While this is the focus of this paper, we also pay some attention to the 
second mechanism of how international trade can affect wages in a union bargaining 
framework. More specifically, we also provide some evidence whether Belgian 
manufacturing wages are affected by international trade through changes in the firms’ profits 
per worker. In the next section, we proceed with the stage-one regressions where we estimate 
the workers’ relative bargaining power parameters. Subsequently, we relate these parameters 
to several globalisation measures.  
 
3. STAGE-ONE REGRESSIONS: ESTIMATING WORKERS’ (RELATIVE) 
BARGAINING POWER 
 
 
To identify the effect of international trade on the workers’ bargaining power, our 
estimation strategy consists of two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the workers’ relative 
                                                
10 In a related paper, Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002) investigate whether affiliate wages are affected 
by affiliate and parent profitability. Their results reveal that affiliate wages respond to parent profits per 
worker.  
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bargaining power φ  for 15 sectors in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 
1987-1995. In the second stage, we regress the estimated workers’ relative bargaining power 
coefficients on several measures of trade, technology and many control variables. These 
stage-two regressions try to identify the factors that explain the workers’ relative bargaining 
power. 
 
3.1. Specification and data description 
 
The econometric specification that acts as the basis for the stage-one regressions is 
derived from expression (4) and is given by:  
 ijtti
ijt
jtjtijt N
Uww εααpiφδδα +++


+++= lnlnlnln 2
0
10  (5) 
with β
βφ
−
=
1
 as the workers’ relative bargaining power and where index jti  stands for firm 
i  in sector j  at time t . To estimate equation (5), we use an unbalanced panel of the entire 
population of Belgian firms in the manufacturing industry over the period 1987-1995. All 
variables are taken from annual company accounts which are collected by the National Bank 
of Belgium (NBB). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average real annual 
wage in firm i . The workers’ outside option ( aw  in equation (3)) is proxied by the sector-
average real annual wage per worker ( 0jtw ) and the sectoral unemployment rate ( jtU ). To 
capture the firm’s financial conditions, we use accounting profits, which are taken directly 
from the company accounts database. In the analysis, we exclude loss-making firms. All 
annual wages are expressed as real wages, i.e. nominal wages divided by the consumer price 
index with 1990 as reference year. Consumer price indexes were drawn from the Belgostat 
source of the NBB.11 Average profits are also expressed in real terms, i.e. nominal profits 
divided by the producer price index. The producer price index is obtained from the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs.12 Average wages and profits are constructed by dividing annual labour 
costs and profits by the average number of employees in each firm for each year respectively. 
ijtε  represents a white noise error term. We also include time dummies to capture possible 
unobservable aggregate shocks common to all firms in a given year ( tα ). By taking the first 
(logarithmic) difference of equation (4), we control for individual firm effects ( iα ). As a 
                                                
11 These data can be downloaded from http:/ / www.nbb.be/ belgostat/ . 
12 These data can be downloaded from http:/ / ecodata.mineco.fgov.be. 
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consequence, our parameter estimates are consistent even if iα  were correlated with 
regressors. Table 1 includes some summary statistics of the key explanatory variables for the 
period 1987-1995.   
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
3.2. Estimation Strategy 
 
Four Approaches to Balancing Time-series and Cross-section Pooling 
 
To exploit fully the data’s panel aspect, we report results of equation (5) for four different 
approaches to balancing cross-sectional and time-series pooling. The first approach pools all 
15 sectors over all the years. This yields one manufacturing-wide rent-sharing parameter φ  
over the period 1987-1995. The second approach pools all the 15 sectors in each year, hence, 
stressing the time-series dimension. This yields annual manufacturing-wide rent-sharing 
parameters but it restricts all sectors to share the same rent-sharing parameter. To allow some 
variation within manufacturing, the third and the fourth approach provide estimates of φ  for 
each sector separately. The third approach gives sector-specific rent-sharing parameters for 
the whole period, hence, focusing on the cross-section dimension. The fourth approach allows 
the rent-sharing parameter to vary over time and over sector, i.e. β  is estimated for each 
sector separately year by year. These latter estimates will be used in the second-stage 
regression when we try to explain the determinants of the workers’ relative bargaining power.   
 
Econometric Problems 
 
Ordinary least squares estimates of equation (5) will be biased for basically two reasons. 
First, our dependent variable, the wages per worker, is negatively related to the profits per 
worker by construction. Second, the estimates of β  will be biased if rents per worker were 
measured with error. Measurement error can be present since both our wage and profit 
variable are divided by employment (Van Reenen, 1996, among others for a discussion). In 
other words, performing an OLS regression on equation (5) would lead to an endogeneity 
bias. Therefore, we try to find appropriate instruments for our empirical analysis.   
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Instrumentation Strategy 
 
The econometric problems described above show that instrumentation is a necessary 
strategy to obtain consistent estimates of the rent-sharing parameter. Valid instruments must 
reflect changes in product market conditions inducing movements in rents per worker but they 
must be uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equation.  
Our instrumentation strategy consists of two steps. In a first step, we use lagged levels of 
profits as instruments to estimate the rent-sharing parameters for the four approaches 
described above. For sake of comparison, we also report the OLS results. Our second step 
aims at introducing one of the channels through which international trade affects bargained 
wages, i.e. through movements in rents. More specifically, we use instruments that represent 
exogenous demand shocks that enter the wage equation only through the profits per worker 
variable. First, inspired by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada and Abowd and Allain 
(1996) and Kramarz (2003) for France, we use the prices of imports and exports in the 
industry as a source of exogenous variation in the firm’s product market conditions. The fact 
that Belgium is a small open economy justifies treating changes in international prices as 
exogenous demand shocks since international prices are determined on the world market and 
are hence out of reach for Belgian firms. More specifically, we construct unit value indices for 
Belgian imports and exports based on the OECD International Trade by Commodities 
database.13 Following Kramarz (2003) but in contrast to Abowd and Lemieux (1993), we use 
prices expressed in US dollars as exchange rates reflect, to some extent, exogenous changes. 
Moreover, the effect of exchange rates on the Belgian economy is difficult to determine and 
hence we avoided converting the international prices in terms of Belgian francs.  The reason 
is that exchange rates fluctuate quite a lot and their effect on the real economy is difficult to 
determine.  
Second, in line with Bertrand (1999) and Budd and Slaughter (2003), sector-specific 
exchange rates are also used as valid instruments. The reason we also use these variables as 
instruments is because in case there is imperfect competition in certain sectors, using export 
and import prices could no longer be a valid strategy (see also Revenga, 1992, for a 
discussion). Following Kramarz (2003), we could however have used US export prices since 
these variables might be exogenous to the Belgian economy. However, we were not able to do 
this because of data limitations, as there are no reliable data available for our period under 
                                                
13 The base year is 1990. Using this database to construct unit values as a proxy for import and export 
prices is frequently done in the literature (see e.g. Brenton and Pinna, 2000, among others). 
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study in the OECD Trade by Commodities database.14 Moreover, only using US export prices 
makes it difficult to distinguish between the impact of import versus export competition on 
the firms’ rents. Following Budd and Slaughter (2003), we computed trade-weighted 
multilateral Belgian exchange rates for each sector and each year where we also weigh 
bilateral exchange rates with import shares.15 
Since the international prices and the exchange rates are defined at the sectoral level, they 
cannot be used as instruments when estimating sector-specific rent-sharing parameters, as 
there is no cross-sectional variation in that case. Therefore, we only report the results at the 
most aggregated level, i.e. pooled over sectors and over years.  Using the export and the 
import prices at the one hand and the sector-specific exchange rates at the other hand as 
instruments in our regression equations, also serves as a consistency check for our estimations 
where we use the lags of the profit variables as instruments.   
 
3.3. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, the empirical results of the four approaches are reported.  
 
First Approach: Pooling over Sectors and over Years 
 
In this section, we provide manufacturing-wide estimates of the rent-sharing parameter 
over the period 1991-1995. The first part of Table 2 presents the Ordinary Least Squares 
estimate of equation (5). Controlling for year-, sector- and firm-level effects, the estimated 
wages-profits elasticity amount to 0.09 and is strongly significant. This point estimate is 
somewhat higher than the one of Goos and Konings (2001) who find an elasticity of 0.06. 
This point estimate also clearly shows that symmetric Nash bargaining, in case we would 
have a coefficient of the relative bargaining power equal to one, could easily be rejected.  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
However, as discussed above, OLS estimates are likely to be affected by endogeneity 
biases. Therefore, we test the endogeneity of profits per worker in two ways. First, we use the 
                                                
14 Kramarz (2003) however uses the same OECD dataset but uses a different time period.  
15 We only took the trade flows of those countries for which their share in the Belgian imports exceeds 2 
percent.  
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Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. From Table 2, this test indicates that the OLS specification is 
rejected. Second, as suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), we perform an 
augmented regression test. More specifically, we regress the endogenous variable (profits per 
worker) on the set of instruments and the exogenous variables in the wage equation. We 
recuperate the residual of this regression and augment the wage equation with this residual. 
The exogeneity test amounts to testing whether the coefficient of the residual equals zero in 
the wage equation. In line with the Durbin-Hausman-Wu test, this augmented regression test 
indicates that OLS is not consistent.16   
In the second column of Table 2, we use the 2-period and the 4-period lagged value of 
profits per worker as instruments. The exogeneity of the instruments with respect to the error 
term is tested by the Hansen-Sargan test statistic, which is distributed as chi-squared. The 
specification test does not show evidence against our estimates: the Hausman-Sargan test does 
not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. Taking into account endogeneity, 
we find a wages-profit elasticity of 0.06. From the OLS as well as the TSLS estimates, outside 
forces do not seem to play an important role in the wage determination process.  
To check the robustness of the results, we now present the two consistency checks, 
which also capture the effect of international trade on bargained wages through shifts in the 
size of the rents.  
The third column of Table 2 reports the results of equation (4) using the exchange 
rates from period t  until period 5t( )−  as instruments. The point estimate of the average 
manufacturing-wide wages-profits elasticity is 0.09. Again, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are correct.   
The fourth column of Table 2 reports the estimate of the rent-sharing parameter using 
international prices as instruments. Before discussing the results, we first test whether these 
foreign competition shocks present pure demand shocks. We follow Abowd and Lemieux 
(1993) and Kramarz (2003) and compare least squares estimates of supply equations 
(quantities as a function of prices) to instrumental variables estimates of the same supply 
equation in which the output price is instrumented with the price of imports and the price of 
exports. Least squares estimates of the elasticity of supply with respect to the output price 
could be either negative or positive, depending on the variance of demand and supply shocks 
and on demand and supply elasticities (see Abowd and Lemieux, 1993). Once these output 
prices are instrumented using international prices, however, the elasticity should become 
                                                
16 Results not reported but available upon request. 
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positive if international prices are exogenous demand shocks that trace down the supply 
curve. In the first column of Table 3, we estimate the relation between firm-level real sales 
and sector-level value-added prices, sector-level wages and a time trend in the cross-section 
dimension. In the second column, we control for firm-level fixed effects. In the third column, 
we instrument value-added prices using 4-period lagged import and export prices. The 
estimated supply elasticity using the OLS and the fixed-effects estimation methods is 
statistically significant, reflecting that supply shocks dominate demand shocks. On the other 
hand, the IV estimates point to positive and significant supply elasticity. The elasticity is 
equal to 0.543, which is slightly above the one estimated by Abowd and Lemieux and very 
well in line with the one estimated by Kramarz (2003). The Hansen-Sargan test does not 
reject the joint validity of the instruments. Our findings are hence consistent with the fact that 
international prices represent exogenous demand shocks that increase product market 
competition in Belgium.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Before turning to the IV estimates of the rent-sharing parameter using international 
prices as instruments, we present the reduced-form equations for bargained wages and profits 
per worker in Table 4. All the estimated specifications are in first-differences and all variables 
are expressed as natural logarithms. They all include the price of imports and exports, the 
sector-average wage and the sector unemployment rate as explanatory variables. The 
specifications in columns (1) and (3) also include a time trend. As expected, the price of 
exports has a positive and statistically significant effect on real wages per worker and real 
profits per worker in all specifications. This means that increased foreign competition in the 
form of lower export prices reduces both wages and profits per worker. The estimated effect 
on rents per worker is larger than the estimated effect on wages per worker, implying that 
workers do not capture all the rents created by changes in the price of exports. A rather 
unexpected result is that the price of imports affects both wages and profits per worker 
significantly negatively.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
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From the last column of Table 3, it follows that the estimated wages-profits elasticity 
is considerably higher using international prices as instruments than the ones using lagged 
profit values and exchange rates as instruments. The point estimate is about 0.17.  
Second Approach: Pooling over Sectors per Year 
 
Table 5 reports manufacturing-wide rent-sharing parameters for the years 1991 until 
1995. We present both the OLS and the TSLS estimates using lagged values of profits per 
worker as instruments. For all years, the Hansen-Sargan Test does not reject the joint validity 
of the instruments. For the years 1991, 1992 and 1993, the TSLS estimate is considerable 
larger than the OLS estimate while the opposite is true for the years 1994 and 1995. Focusing 
on the TSLS estimates, we can conclude that the manufacturing-wide wages-profits elasticity 
is highly stable over time and amounts to 0.12 on average. 
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Third Approach: Pooling over Years per Sector 
 
So far, we restricted all sectors to share the same rent-sharing parameter. To address 
the important issue of heterogeneity in workers’ bargaining power across sectors, we now 
split up the manufacturing industry into 15 sectors. An overview of the different sectors is 
given in Table A.1 of Appendix A. The sectoral classification is based on the availability of 
the sectoral classification of the variables used in the second stage and the availability of the 
number of firms within each of these sectors. Table 6 reports rent-sharing estimates for each 
of the 15 sectors over the whole period. As the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the 
OLS estimates in favour of the TSLS estimates, we only report the OLS estimates in Table 6. 
All estimated wages-profits elasticities are highly significant and range from 0.04 (sector 5 
which stands for the printing and allied industries) to 0.268 (sector 14 representing the 
industry of other transport equipment). The results point to considerable variation in rent-
sharing behaviour within the manufacturing sector. Moreover, we performed F-tests to 
investigate whether the rent-sharing parameters differ according industries. The results reject 
the poolability across the different sectors.  
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
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Fourth Approach: Per Sector, per Year 
 
In the fourth approach, we allow the workers’ bargaining power to vary over time and 
over sector. In Table 7, we present both the OLS and the TSLS estimates for each sector 
separately year by year. Focusing on the OLS estimates, we find that 85% of the estimated 
wages-profits elasticities are statistically significant at the 1% level. As far as the TSLS 
estimates are concerned, the results show that 65% of the estimates are statistically significant 
at the 1% level, 8% at the 5% level and 24% are not significant. For almost all specifications, 
we find that the TSLS estimates exceed the OLS estimates. It is also clear that the wages-
profits elasticities vary considerably over time and over sector. For 10 out of the 15 sectors, 
our results show that the estimated rent-sharing parameter is higher in 1995 compared to 
1991. Focusing on the TSLS estimates, the mean of the estimated wages-profits elasticities 
amounts to 0.114 and the standard deviation to 0.055. All sector-specific elasticities vary 
between 0.014 and 0.092.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
4. THE STAGE-TWO REGRESSIONS: THE DETERMINANTS OF THE 
WORKERS’ RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER 
 
4.1 Specification and data description 
 
The empirical methodology for the stage-two regressions borrows from Slaughter 
(2001) who investigates the impact of international trade on labour demand elasticities 
following a two-stage approach.  As pointed out by Svejnar (1986), no literature exists 
on an appropriate function form of the determinants of the workers’ relative bargaining 
power. In other words, we could not estimate one or more structural equations based 
on a general equilibrium model. Therefore, we estimate a reduced-form equation of the 
estimated relative workers’ bargaining power φ  of the first stage on several explanatory 
variables derived from an implicit structural model. More specifically, we use the 
following reduced-form regression: 
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With jtφ  the estimated relative workers’ bargaining power obtained from the first stage 
regressions with the subscript j denoting industry and the subscript t denoting time. jkX  
refers to a specific explanatory variable with K the total number of explanatory 
variables,  jID  denoting an industry specific dummy for industry j, tTD  referring to a 
time dummy for period t and jtu  is the error term for the second stage regression 
equation (6). These industry and time dummies capture other variables explaining 
workers’ relative bargaining power that are not included in the above stage-two 
regression equation. More specifically, industry dummies capture variables that are 
industry-specific and time invariant such as differences in job type and the type of 
product in a certain industry, differences in unions’ utility functions as some unions 
might care relative more about employment than about wages, the firms’ holdings of 
inventories, the capital utilisation rate, the union density, etc. (see e.g. McDonald and 
Suen, 1992, Smith, 1996, Doiron, 1992, and for a further discussion on these issues). The 
time dummies control for factors that are not industry specific but change workers’ 
relative bargaining power over time such as e.g. the change in the consumer price index, 
the national unemployment rate, taxes, interest rates, etc (see e.g. Svejnar, 1986 and 
Doiron, 1992 for a discussion).  
 Table 8 provides summary statistics for our explanatory variables. These variables 
are constructed such that they match the first stage sectoral classification of the firth 
approach of the first-stage analysis. Table A.1 in Appendix A gives an overview of the 
sectoral classification used to determine the workers’ relative bargaining power per 
sector each year. More specifically, we have five variables related to international trade, 
three variables related to foreign direct investment, three technology variables and three 
control variables. Some of these variables have been used in earlier studies of the 
determinants of workers’ bargaining power (see e.g. Veugelers, 1989 and Svejnar, 1986), 
while other variables related to international trade and foreign direct have, except for 
the paper of Budd and Slaughter (2003), not been related to workers’ bargaining power. 
As argued before, we further investigate this issue and introduce a richer specification 
such that we are able to further investigate whether globalisation has an effect on the 
unions’ relative bargaining power. In what follows, we describe the explanatory variables 
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of equation (6) together with their expected effect on the workers’ relative bargaining 
power parameter. This effect is also shown in the last column of Table 8.  
 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
 
• Trade variable 1: the ratio of imports to production. We expect that the higher this 
measure in a certain sector, the lower the workers’ bargaining will be because 
increased import competition leads to less favourable labour market conditions or 
firms’ profit conditions such that workers might end up with a less smaller share of 
the rents.  
• Trade variable 2: the ratio of exports to production. In the case of export expansion, 
the opposite result holds: unions are more able to extract higher rents in those 
sectors with a strong export performance.  
• Trade variable 3: narrow outsourcing divided by production. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999) refer to narrow outsourcing as outsourcing within the same industry as the 
importer. We expect this variable to have a negative effect on the workers’ 
bargaining power. Like a lot of other OECD countries, the Belgian economy is 
confronted with quite a lot of outsourcing, mostly of standardised products. As 
pointed out by a survey of the Federal Planning Office (2000), lower labour costs in 
the host country are the main motive for outsourcing. A priori, we however expect 
that outsourcing is accompanied with less favourable labour market conditions for 
Belgian employees and hence lower their relative bargaining power as they see it 
necessary to restrain wages.     
• Trade variable 4: broad outsourcing divided by production. In contrast to narrow 
outsourcing, this measure also includes intermediate imports coming from others 
sectors. The expected effect of this variable on the workers’ bargaining power is the 
same as for the narrow outsourcing variable.  
• Trade variable 5 refers to tariffs. As discussed in Budd and Slaughter (2003), tariffs are 
able to shield domestic markets from foreign competition. More specifically, we 
expect a positive link between tariffs and the workers’ relative bargaining power as 
they feel more eager to press for a higher share of the ‘pie’. 
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• Foreign direct investment variable 1: the number of foreign owned firms relative to the 
total number of firms. In what follows, we experiment with several variables related 
to inward foreign direct investment.17 Similar to Budd and Slaughter (2003), the 
expected effect on the workers’ relative bargaining power is both positive and 
negative. At the one hand, there is evidence that foreign-owned companies pay 
higher wages than domestic firms. Aitken et al. (1996) show that in Mexico, 
Venezuela and the United States, higher foreign direct investment levels are 
associated with higher wages. Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin (2001). Fabbri, Haskel 
and Slaughter (2002) also find that UK multinationals pay higher wages than 
domestically owned firms. However, these papers do not whether investigate whether 
rent-sharing is dependent on the firm’s ownership structure. An exception is the 
paper of Budd and Slaughter (2003) who investigate whether rent-sharing is higher 
in multinational firms. Their empirical results reveal that this is not the case. As an 
explanation, they argue that this result stems from additional complexities of 
multinational ownership and that parent companies might feel competitive pressure 
when Canadian industry profits are high and hence try to restrain wages. In other 
words, labour costs consideration might play an important role such that firms are 
more aggressive during wage negotiations since they want to resist to wage increases.  
We also think that there is an alternative explanation given by the footloose 
nature of multinationals firms as multinationals can shift their entire or part of their 
production to another country in case the present circumstances are unfavourable 
(Caves, 1996). The footloose nature of multinational companies is documented by 
Gorg and Strobl (2003) who find that, after controlling for plant and industry-
specific characteristics, Irish multinational companies are more likely to shut down 
operations in comparison to domestic firms. For the US, Bernard and Jensen (2002) 
provide empirical evidence that plants owned by US multinationals are more likely 
to close down than plants of non-multinationals. Fabri et al. (2002) find that 
multinational plants, both UK and foreign-owned, are more likely to close down in 
comparison than domestic plants, conditional on variables such as related to 
operational advantage making these multinationals less likely to shut down such as 
                                                
17 Because of data availability, we are not able to test for the effect of outward foreign direct investment 
on the workers’ relative bargaining power. As pointed out by Slaughter (2001), this measure can be used 
as an alternative proxy for outsourcing.  
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being older and larger. The empirical evidence of the footloose nature of foreign-
owned firms is therefore able to create a general atmosphere of uncertainty in which 
workers are less likely to press for higher wages in the form of obtaining a part of 
the firms’ profits. Schreve and Slaughter (2002) investigate whether foreign direct 
investment has an effect on the workers’ feeling of insecurity. At the one hand, 
multinational presence is able to increase the workers’ economic insecurity by 
raising the volatility of wages and employment. At the other hand, Schreve and 
Slaughter argue that an explanation for the higher wages in foreign-owned firms 
could be consistent with a with a story where workers get compensated more 
because they are facing a higher risk of plant shut down. Therefore, the ex ante 
expectation regarding the impact of foreign direct investment on worker insecurity 
is unclear. When the authors test their hypothesis, foreign direct investment 
increases the workers’ perception of economic insecurity measured as a person’s 
stress/ anxiety about one’s economic misfortune.  
While direct evidence for the footloose nature of multinationals in the Belgian 
economy is lacking, De Backere and Sleuwaegen (2003) find that inward foreign direct 
investment discourages entry and stimulates exit of Belgian domestic entrepreneurs. 
However, this crowding out effect might be moderated or even reversed in the long term 
because of learning, demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreign and 
domestic firms. Therefore, these results might add to the workers’ feeling of insecurity 
and hence influence their bargaining power. Whether the effect of inward foreign direct 
investment on the bargaining power of workers of incumbent firms is positive or negative 
remains however an empirical issue.  
• Foreign direct investment variable 2 (and 3) refers to the employment (value added) of 
foreign-owned firms relative to the total employment (value added). The expected 
effect on the workers’ bargaining power is the same as that for foreign direct 
investment variable 1.  
• Technology variable 1: Research and Development (RD) divided by production. 
Subsequently, we experiment with several technology variables. It is often argued 
that technological change, instead of international trade, lies at the basis of changes 
in the labour market (see e.g. Berman et al., 1994, and Krugman and Lawrence, 1996). 
As a first technology measure, research and development divided by production is a 
measure for innovative input. A priori, we expect the effect of technological change 
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on the workers’ bargaining power to be positive or negative. As discussed in 
Betcherman (1991), technological change can effect the distribution of the ‘pie’ 
between employers and employees. The core of their story is that technological 
change can affect the nature of the production process.18 First, Betcherman (1991) 
argues that workers will have higher bargaining power in case labour costs do not 
constitute a large part of the firm’s total costs. The reason is that the less important 
labour costs are, the less an increase in the price of labour will cause an increase in 
the product price and hence negatively affect the firm’s product demand. 
Betcherman (1991) points out that the impact of technological change on the 
importance of labour costs is a priori unclear and depends on the bias of 
technological change.  
Second, Betcherman (1991) points out that the workers’ essentiality in terms of 
their indispensability in the production process, is another channel explaining the 
impact of technological change on the workers’ bargaining power. When employees 
are essential to production, they have strong bargaining power during wage 
negotiations. The workers being essential in the production process depend on how 
critical their skills are, their knowledge and resources and how costly a strike would 
be for the firm. Technological change can change the workers’ essentiality. Again, 
the effect is not clear. At the one hand, technological change can be labour-
augmenting in the sense that the introduction of new production processes and 
technologies go hand in hand with the use of more labour. At the other hand, 
technological change can also be labour-saving when investment in new technology 
leads to lower use of labour. This last mechanism could be very important in Europe 
in general and Belgium in particular where high labour costs prevail (Abraham and 
Verret, 1996). The empirical results of Betcherman (1991)19 reveal that the workers’ 
bargaining power for blue-collar workers is lower in firms, which introduced process 
computerisation. For skilled workers the workers’ bargaining power is also lower but 
                                                
18 These authors however use union/ non-union wage differentials as a proxy for workers’ bargaining 
power. Moreover, they use a story of change in labour demand elasticities to explain the effect on the 
workers’ bargaining power.   
19 As often done in the literature, the workers’ bargaining power is measured as the union/ non-union 
wage differential. In contrast to their analysis, we are not able to make a distinction between blue- and 
white collar workers.  
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general manual occupations have a higher bargaining power in case of process 
computerisation.    
• Technology variable 2: patents divided by production. This measure is related to 
innovative output. The expected effect of this variable on the workers’ relative 
bargaining power is the same as technology variable 1. 
• Technology variable 3: the percentage change in Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP 
measures the gains that raise the productivity of all production factors. We assume 
that higher TFP growth is associated with technological change and therefore expect 
the same effect on the workers’ relative bargaining power like for technology 
variables 1 and 2.  
• Control variable 1: the unemployment rate. This variable has also been used by other 
authors investigating the determinants of workers’ bargaining power (see among 
others, Veugelers, 1987, and Svejnar, 1986, Donald and Suen, 1992). As already 
discussed in Section 2.2 of this paper, we expect a negative coefficient for this 
variable. 
• Control variable 2: the C5-concentration ratio and represents the sales of the top 5 
firms divided by the total sales. A higher C5-concentration ratio is consistent with 
less fierce product market competition. As discussed in Veugelers (1987), higher 
output market concentration is able to increase the management’s ability to raise 
prices above marginal costs and therefore producers are less sensitive to wage 
increase since they can shift cost increases --- e.g. higher wage costs --- to consumers. 
In other words, a higher C5-concentration ratio is expected to have a positive impact 
on the workers’ bargaining power. However, this author also argues that more 
market power in the product market could also be transferred to power positions in 
the input market such that the workers’ bargaining power is eroded. Therefore, the 
expected coefficient of the C5-concentration ratio is positive or negative depending 
on which of these two mechanisms prevail.  
• Control variable 3: the capacity utilisation ratio. This variable represents the general 
state of the economy. A higher capacity utilisation ratio reflects a better economic 
situation and hence should allow the unions to press for higher wages. We therefore 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable.  
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4.2  Estimation strategy 
 
As indicated earlier, our estimation strategy closely follows the empirical 
methodology of Slaughter (2001) who investigates the effect on international trade on 
labour demand elasticities. While other authors investigating the determinants of the 
union’s (relative) bargaining power have estimated one single equation (see Doiron, 1992, 
Svejnar, 1986, and Veugelers, 1987, among others), we preferred to estimate equation (6) 
where we use each of the 14 explanatory variables separately. The reason is, as already 
pointed out before, that there is no formal theory explaining the workers’ relative 
bargaining power. In what follows, we discuss three important issues regarding our 
estimation strategy and closely follow the work of Slaughter (2001). 
A first issue has to do with the exogeneity of the regressors. Variables related to 
outsourcing and technology are endogenously determined input variables. As 
documented in other work (see e.g. Abowd and Lemieux, 1993), import and export 
quantities are --- in contrast to export and import prices in a small open economy --- not 
fully exogenous since these depend on domestic demand and supply conditions. 
Regarding the trade variables, we expect our tariff measure to be the most exogenous 
variable (see also Haskel and Slaughter, 2002, for a discussion).  As a consistency check, 
we used lags of the trade and technology variables instead of their contemporaneous 
values.20  The results indicate that when using the fixed effects and the fixed effects 
together with the time dummies, some variables are no longer statistically significant.  
A second issue is related to the fact that the dependent variable from equation 
(6) is estimated in the first stage. Therefore, the error term in this equation is 
heteroskedastic with zero mean and variance equal to the variance of the error term of 
the first stage regression plus the variance of the estimated relative workers’ bargaining 
power φ . Following Slaughter and Anderson (1993), we also correct for this form of 
heteroskedasticity by weighing less heavily those observations for which the variance of 
the relative bargaining power is higher. More specifically, we perform an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression on equation (6) from which we take the squared 
residuals. Subsequently, we regress these squared residuals on the variance of the 
                                                
20 It was not possible to use the lags of the outsourcing variables as we don’t have enough observations 
through time.  
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relative bargaining power coefficients, together with these variances squared and cubed. 
Finally, we use the inverse of the predicted values of this regression as weights in a 
weighted least squares of equation (6). 
A last issue is related to the fact that, as already pointed out before, that there is 
no real theoretical model predicting which variables to use in a regression equation 
explaining the workers’ relative bargaining power. As a robustness check, we estimate 
equation (6) using several combinations of the independent variables. More specifically, 
we combine one trade variable or one foreign direct investment variable with one 
technology variable and one control variable. In general, our results are fairly robust 
when using these different combinations.21 Moreover, we also experimented with several 
combinations of the industry and time dummies and tried four different combinations 
like in Slaughter (2001) who uses regressions with no controls, only industry dummies, 
only time dummies and a combination of both.  
 
4.3  Empirical results 
 
 Table 9 reports the regression results of equation (6), using each time one single 
independent variable. In general, the regression results of this table reveal that, except 
for the control variables, the expected signs of the regression coefficients are obtained. 
However, in a number of cases, these regression coefficients are not always statistically 
significant as their significance depends on the inclusion of the industry and time fixed 
effects.  
 
< Insert Table 9 here > 
 
 Regarding the international trade variables, we find some evidence that 
international trade has an impact on the unions’ relative bargaining power. In our 
estimations with no controls, the export/ production and the tariff variables, have t-
values of at least one and this last variable is even significant at the 1% level. Higher 
exports in a sector induce workers to capture a higher share of the rents. In sectors 
where higher tariffs apply and hence are more shielded from international competition, 
                                                
21 The results are available from the authors upon request.  
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workers are able to capture a higher share of the ‘pie’. The sign of the regression 
coefficient of the imports/ production has the expected sign but is not statistically 
significant.  
 For the regressions with only the industry fixed effects, the import/ production 
variable has now a statistically significant regression coefficient meaning that in those 
sectors with higher import competition the share of rents going to workers is squeezed. 
The variable for the import tariffs remains statistically significant and has the expected 
sign. If industry-fixed effects are used, we are in fact focussing on the intra-sectoral 
rather than on the inter-sectoral variation of the variables.22 In other words, the focus is 
on how the workers’ relative bargaining power moves over time within each sector 
rather than on how the relative bargaining power moves over the different sectors.  
When all controls are introduced, both the tariffs and the import variable stay 
statistically significant and have the correct sign. Moreover, it is also the case that our 
export variable becomes statistically significant meaning that workers are able to push 
for higher wages in case their firms are exporting a lot.  
 In the regressions with only the time fixed effects, all trade variables loose their 
statistical significance. One explanation is that there is not much intersectoral variation 
over time of the independent variables such that the time-fixed effects pick up a lot of 
the variation in the relative bargaining power parameters. Following Slaughter (2001), 
who also obtains this empirical result in his paper on the determinants of the labour 
demand elasticities, we checked by using plots by each sector of each independent 
variable against time to see whether these trade variables possess enough intersectoral 
variation over time. Inspection of the data shows that the import/ production variable 
has increased in nearly all sectors, while the export/ production variable has for most 
sectors remained rather stable. In order to test further whether our relative bargaining 
power parameters are driven by time, we introduced a time trend in our regressions but 
did not find a statistically significant effect for this variable. This result is also consistent 
with our finding of Section 3, which presented not much time variation in our 
estimations of the rent-sharing parameter. Table 9 also reveals that our outsourcing 
variables were never statistically significant.  
                                                
22 The fixed effects estimator is therefore also called the within-estimator in panel data models.  
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Regarding the inward foreign direct investment variables, our results showed that 
workers have lower relative bargaining power in those sectors with a lot of foreign-owned 
firms relative to the total number of firms. Before, we have introduced several explanations 
for this result. First, Budd and Slaughter (2003) have pointed out that this result could be 
consistent with the complex nature of multinational firms in the sense that parent companies 
might feel competitive pressure when affiliate profits are high and hence try to restrain wages. 
Second, the footloose nature of firms induces workers induces workers to bargain for lower 
wages. Third, workers of incumbent firms could also feel less secure as inward foreign direct 
investment might crowd out domestic entrepreneurship and hence create a less favourable 
bargaining environment.  
Strong statistically significant results emerge from our technology variables, 
especially for our variable of innovative input (R&D divided by output). In those industries 
with more technological change, workers are more willing to press for higher wages as these 
workers might be essential in production and/or labour costs become less important because 
of technological change. Statistically significant positive effects are also obtained for the TFP-
variable but the regressions coefficients of the variable for innovative output, patents divided 
by production, are negative.  
We don’t obtain the expected sign for the regression coefficients of our control variables. 
The regression coefficient for the unemployment (capacity utilization) variable shows in some 
cases a negative (positive) statistically significant sign. This positive coefficient for the 
unemployment variable is consistent with the empirical results of other empirical work for 
Belgium (see e.g. Abraham and De Bruyne, 2000) who find that higher unemployment has 
not led to wage moderation.23 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have investigated whether international trade has affected workers’ 
wages for the Belgian manufacturing industry by using a rent-sharing framework. In the first 
part of our analysis, we have studied whether international trade affects wages through 
changes in the firms’ rents. Similar to other papers considering rent-sharing in the Belgian 
economy, we find a positive relation between workers’ wages and the firms’ profits. 
Moreover, our regression revealed that increased foreign competition in the form of lower 
                                                
23 This finding is consistent with results of other European studies finding a weak effect of unemployment 
on wages (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991, and Eichengreen, 1993).  
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export prices reduces both wages and profits per worker. The estimated effect on rents per 
worker is larger than the estimated effect on wages per worker, implying that workers do not 
capture all the rents created by changes in the price of exports. A rather unexpected result was 
that the price of imports affects both wages and profits per worker significantly negatively. 
In the second part of our paper, we have studied whether globalisation has 
affected workers’ bargaining power. As one of the first, Rodrik (1997) has pointed out 
that increased globalisation has eroded workers’ bargaining power. Budd and Slaughter 
(2003) have further investigated this issue and have found that the effect of domestic 
profits on the workers’ wages depends on variables related to foreign direct investment 
and tariffs. We have further explored the link between globalisation and the relative 
bargaining power by also introducing measures related to import and export 
competition, outsourcing, tariffs and foreign direct investment. Although technological 
change seems to have an important effect on the workers’ relative bargaining power, we 
have found that globalisation also matters. More specifically, import and export 
competition and the tariffs seemed to have the expected effect on the workers’ 
bargaining power for some of our regression specifications. Regarding inward foreign 
direct investment, we have found that more foreign-owned firms in a sector reduced the 
workers’ bargaining power. This result is consistent with the results of Budd and 
Slaughter (2003). We have put forward several explanations such as the footloose 
nature of multinational companies and the crowding out of domestic entrepreneurship.  
This work leaves open several paths for future research. First, we considered the 
case of a typical European unionised country. Although rent-sharing is not only present 
in unionised countries (see Nickell, 1999, for a discussion), it could be interesting to see 
whether increased globalisation has effected workers’ bargaining power in a non-
unionised country such as the US. As documented by Baldwin (2003), unions have 
become less important in the US during the last decennia. Second, we did not 
distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers. As widely documented in the trade-
wages literature, international trade and technological change have a different impact on 
skilled versus unskilled workers. A follow-up paper is forthcoming addressing these 
issues and investigating the impact of globalisation on workers’ bargaining power for the 
US. 
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Table 1    Stage-one Regression: Summary Statistics  
Variables 1987-1995 
 # Obs. Mean (x 100 000 BEF) Sd. 
Firm-average Real Wage per 
Worker 109 208 9.859 6.952 
Firm-average Real Profits per 
Worker 108 153 4.242 20.247 
Sector Unemployment Rate (%) 122 174 15.345 6.012 
Sector-average Real Wage per 
Worker 123 421 8.722 0.963 
Source: National Bank of Belgium (NBB). 
 
 
 
Table 2   Wage Equation 1991-1995, First Approach: Pooling over Sectors and over Years.  
ESTIMATION 
METHOD OLS TSLS
a TSLSb TSLSc 
Constant 0.031
***
 
(0.003) 
0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
Profits per 
Worker 
0.095*** 
(0.005) 
0.063* 
(0.036) 
0.090* 
(0.051) 
0.171* 
(0.092) 
Sectoral Unempl. -0.015 (0.018) 
0.007 
(0.035) 
-0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.023) 
Sectoral av. Wage 0.159 (0.118) 
0.080 
(0.161) 
0.159 
(0.120) 
0.153 
(0.118) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Durbin-Wu-
Hausman Test (p-
value) 
0.0025    
Hansen-Sargan 
IV Test 
p-value 
 0.154 0.290 0.079 
Obs. 73 361 26 025 73 351 73 351 
2R  0.077 0.112 0.077 0.035 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
The dependent variable is the firm-average real wage per worker. All variables are expressed as natural logarithms 
and are first-differenced. The instruments are in levels. Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test: test of endogeneity of real 
profits per worker. 
Hansen-Sargan Instrument Validity Test: tests of correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as 2dfχ .   
a: instruments: profits per worker t-2 , profits per worker t-4. 
b: instruments: exchange rates t, t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5. 
c: instruments: export prices t, import prices t. 
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Table 3   Supply Equation, 1987-1995.  
 ESTIMATION 
METHOD OLS 
Firm Fixed 
Effects TSLS
a 
Constant 19.386
***
 
(6.481) 
-48.951*** 
(1.705) 
19.483*** 
(1.492) 
Price of Value 
Added 
-0.571*** 
(0.103) 
-0.126*** 
(0.028) 
0.543*** 
(0.205) 
Sectoral av. Wage 2.775
***
 
(0.075) 
0.200* 
(0.120) 
0.351** 
(0.164) 
Time Trend -0.010
***
 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.001) 
-0.010***  
(0.001) 
Obs. 71 594 71 594 45 390 
2R  0.022 0.026 . 
Hansen-Sargan 
IV Test 
p-value 
0.022 0.026 0.103 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
The dependent variable is firm-level real sales. The prices and wages are measured at the industry level. All 
variables and instruments are expressed as natural logarithms.  The price of value added and the wage are deflated 
by the CPI (1990=100), while sales are deflated by the producer price.  
A full stop in the 2R box indicates that the calculated 2R was negative and hence is not reported.  
a: instruments: import prices t-4 , export prices t-4. 
 
 
 
Table 4   OLS Estimates of the Reduced Forms for Wages and Profits per Worker, 1987-1995.  
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE Firm-average Real Wage per Worker 
Firm-average Real Profits per 
Worker 
Constant 12.747
***
 
(1.404) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.763 
(4.056) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
Sectoral Unempl. -0.039
***
 
(0.013) 
-0.043*** 
(0.015) 
-0.125*** 
(0.040) 
-0.122*** 
(0.037) 
Sectoral av. Wage 0.123 (0.128) 
0.118 
(0.128) 
-0.054 
(0.370) 
-0.048* 
(0.368) 
Import Price -0.026
***
  
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.040*** 
(0.015) 
-0.039*** 
(0.014) 
Export Price 0.021
***
 
(0.003) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.035*** 
(0.013) 
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
Time Trend -0.006
***
 
(0.001)  
0.0004 
(0.002)  
Obs. 73 351 73 351 73 383 73 383 
2R  0.003 0.002 0.0003 0.0003 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
The dependent variables are firm-average real wage per worker and firm-average real profits per worker. All 
variables are expressed as natural logarithms and are first-differenced. 
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Table 5   Wage Equation, Second Approach: Pooling over Sectors, by Year. 
 
Estimation 
Method 
OLS TSLSa 
1991 
Profits per 
Worker 
0.068*** 
(0.004) 
0.120*** 
(0.007) 
Hansen-Sargan 
IV Test 
p-value 
 0.674 
Obs. 12 218 5 957 
1992 
Profits per 
Worker 
0.062*** 
(0.004) 
0.124*** 
(0.009) 
Hansen-Sargan 
IV Test 
p-value 
 0.872 
Obs. 12 627 6 053 
1993 
Profits per 
Worker 
0.081*** 
(0.006) 
0.131*** 
(0.009) 
Hansen-Sargan 
IV Test 
p-value 
 0.182 
Obs. 12 626 5 946 
1994 
Profits per 
Worker 
0.271*** 
(0.013) 
0.102***  
(0.014) 
Hansen-Sargan 
IV Test 
p-value 
 0.806 
Obs. 12 719 5 958 
1995 
Profits per 
Worker 
0.282*** 
(0.013) 
0.133*** 
(0.014) 
Hansen-Sargan 
IV Test 
p-value 
 0.245 
Obs. 12 715 6 163 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
The dependent variable is the firm-average real wage per worker. All variables are expressed as natural logarithms.  
Hansen-Sargan Instrument Validity Test: tests of correlation among instruments and residuals, asymptotically distributed as 
2
dfχ .   
a: instruments: profits per worker t-3 , profits per worker t-4. 
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Table 6     Wage Equation, OLS Estimates, Third Approach: Pooling over Years, by Sector. 
                Code 
NACE-70 Name 
Wage-profits 
Elasticity 
Sec 1 41+42 Food, beverages and tobacco 0.104
*** 
(0.003) 
Sec 2 43 Textiles 0.090
*** 
(0.005) 
Sec 3  44+45 Wearing apparel and leather and products 
0.083*** 
(0.004) 
Sec 4 46 Wood products and furniture and fixtures 
0.059*** 
(0.004) 
Sec 5 471+472 Manufacture of pulp, paper and board 
0.039*** 
(0.009) 
Sec 6 473+474 Printing and allied industries 0.050
*** 
(0.004) 
Sec 7 25+26 Chemical industry and man-made fibres 
0.122*** 
(0.008) 
Sec 8 48 Rubber and plastic products 0.060
*** 
(0.006) 
Sec 9 24 Non-metallic mineral products 0.086
*** 
(0.005) 
Sec 10 22 Basic metal industries 0.072
*** 
(0.023) 
Sec 11 31 Metal products 0.214
**
 
(0.011) 
Sec 12 32 Non-electrical machinery 0.234
***
 
(0.021) 
Sec 13 
33+34+37 Office and computing 
machinery, electrical 
machinery and professional 
goods 
0.236*** 
(0.017) 
Sec 14 35+36 Other transport equipment 0.268
***
 
(0.027) 
Sec 15 49 Other manufacturing 0.078
***
 
(0.006) 
   ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
All variables are expressed as natural logarithms and are first-differenced. 
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Table 7   Wage Equation, Fourth Approach: Per Sector, by Year. 
Sector Year 
Wage-profits 
elasticity 
(OLS) 
Wage-profits 
elasticity 
(TSLS) 
Sec1 1991 0.107
***
 
(0.010) 
0.151*** 
(0.018) 
 1992 0.092
***
 
(0.009) 
0.154*** 
(0.020) 
 1993 0.099
***
 
(0.010) 
0.131*** 
(0.018) 
 1994 0.115
***
 
(0.010) 
0.148*** 
(0.016) 
 1995 0.108
***
 
(0.008) 
0.182*** 
(0.016) 
Sec2 1991 0.088
***
 
(0.013) 
0.128*** 
(0.020) 
 1992 0.076
***
 
(0.013) 
0.118*** 
(0.023) 
 1993 0.069
***
 
(0.013) 
0.136*** 
(0.025) 
 1994 0.090
***
 
(0.015) 
0.119*** 
(0.027) 
 1995 0.103
***
 
(0.016) 
0.145*** 
(0.030) 
Sec3 1991 0.073
***
 
(0.012) 
0.118*** 
(0.023) 
 1992 0.073
***
 
(0.011) 
0.115*** 
(0.022) 
 1993 0.072
***
 
(0.012) 
0.109*** 
(0.025) 
 1994 0.073
***
 
(0.014) 
0.116*** 
(0.024) 
 1995 0.083
***
 
(0.012) 
0.111*** 
(0.026) 
Sec4 1991 0.053
***
 
(0.013) 
0.081*** 
(0.021) 
 1992 0.027
*** 
(0.012) 
0.125*** 
(0.022) 
 1993 0.043
***
 
(0.013) 
0.112*** 
(0.023) 
 1994 0.073
***
 
(0.012) 
0.103*** 
(0.023) 
 1995 0.066
***
 
(0.014) 
0.076*** 
(0.021) 
Sec5 1991 0.075
***
 
(0.025) 
0.035 
(0.049) 
 1992 0.076
***
 
(0.027) 
0.073 
(0.056) 
 1993 0.064
**
 
(0.034) 
0.043 
(0.031) 
 1994 0.021 (0.025) 
0.063** 
(0.031) 
 1995 0.049
**
 
(0.024) 
0.127*** 
(0.036) 
Sec6 1991 0.041
***
 
(0.013) 
0.063 
(0.023) 
 1992 0.031*** 0.051** 
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(0.012) (0.027) 
 1993 0.050
***
 
(0.012) 
0.075*** 
(0.029) 
 1994 0.050
***
 
(0.011) 
0.099*** 
(0.024) 
 1995 0.035
***
 
(0.011) 
0.111*** 
(0.023) 
Sec7 1991 0.125
***
 
(0.021) 
0.192*** 
(0.035) 
 1992 0.130
***
 
(0.022) 
0.292*** 
(0.051) 
 1993 0.121
***
 
(0.022) 
0.262*** 
(0.051) 
 1994 0.111
***
 
(0.019) 
0.203*** 
(0.039) 
 1995 0.137
***
 
(0.022) 
0.201*** 
(0.034)  
Sec8 1991 0.064
***
 
(0.016) 
0.055** 
(0.030) 
 1992 0.033
*
 
(0.020) 
0.056 
(0.040) 
 1993 0.072
***
 
(0.019) 
0.061* 
(0.035) 
 1994 0.051
***
 
(0.014) 
0.084*** 
(0.029) 
 1995 0.102
***
 
(0.019) 
0.135*** 
(0.034) 
Sec9 1991 0.082
***
 
(0.014) 
0.164*** 
(0.030) 
 1992 0.062
***
 
(0.014) 
0.163*** 
(0.029) 
 1993 0.101
***
 
(0.015) 
0.090*** 
(0.025) 
 1994 0.091
***
 
(0.012) 
0.070*** 
(0.026) 
 1995 0.081
***
 
(0.014) 
0.091*** 
(0.026) 
Sec10 1991 0.004 (0.044) 
0.062 
(0.074) 
 1992 0.004 (0.058) 
0.085 
(0.075) 
 1993 0.112
*
 
(0.062) 
0.221 
(0.116)  
 1994 0.161
***
 
(0.043) 
0.112 
(0.157) 
 1995 0.171
***
 
(0.041) 
0.199 
(0.165) 
Sec11 1991 0.043
***
 
(0.009) 
0.087*** 
(0.016) 
 1992 0.035
***
 
(0.009) 
0.084*** 
(0.018) 
 1993 0.095
***
 
(0.025) 
0.079*** 
(0.024) 
 1994 0.480
***
 
(0.031) 
0.136 
(0.101) 
 1995 0.496
***
 
(0.028) 
0.038 
(0.072) 
Sec12 1991 0.060
***
 
(0.015) 
0.068*** 
(0.028) 
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 1992 0.038
***
 
(0.013) 
0.063** 
(0.031) 
 1993 0.093
**
 
(0.041) 
0.166*** 
(0.044) 
 1994 0.570
***
 
(0.053) 
0.110 
(0.174) 
 1995 0.554
***
 
(0.048) 
0.124 
(0.267) 
Sec13 1991 0.069
***
 
(0.017) 
0.158*** 
(0.031) 
 1992 0.092
***
 
(0.017) 
0.136*** 
(0.031) 
 1993 0.083
***
 
(0.017) 
0.127*** 
(0.039) 
 1994 0.485
***
 
(0.037) 
0.191 
(0.105) 
 1995 0.504
***
 
(0.037) 
0.206*** 
(0.090) 
Sec14 1991 0.006 (0.018) 
0.014 
(0.052) 
 1992 0.048
**
 
(0.024) 
0.022 
(0.022) 
 1993 0.019 (0.020) 
0.095* 
(0.054) 
 1994 0.575
***
 
(0.046) 
0.029 
(0.310) 
 1995 0.624
***
 
(0.053) 
0.057 
(0.184) 
Sec15 1991 0.092
***
 
(0.017) 
0.145*** 
(0.034) 
 1992 0.077
***
 
(0.019) 
0.125*** 
(0.036) 
 1993 0.061
***
 
(0.018) 
0.085*** 
(0.028) 
 1994 0.092
***
 
(0.023) 
0.076** 
(0.037) 
 1995 0.093
***
 
(0.021) 
0.099*** 
(0.041) 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
All variables are expressed as natural logarithms. 
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Table 8   Second stage: summary Statistics  
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Number of 
observations 
Sample 
mean 
Sample std. 
dev. 
Sample 
minimum 
Sample 
maximum 
Effect on 
bargaining 
power 
Trade variables 
Import/production 75 1.05 1.20 0.17 5.76 B < 0 
Export/production 75 0.47 0.61 0.02 2.26 B > 0 
Outsourcing 
narrow(a) 
30 0.17 0.12 0.002 0.48 B < 0 
Outsourcing 
broad 
30 0.36 0.10 0.14 
 
0.60 B < 0 
Tariffs 30     B > 0 
Inward foreign direct investment variables 
Relative number 
of foreign-owned 
firms 
75 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.28 B > 0  or 
B < 0 
Relative 
employment of 
foreign-owned 
firms 
75 0.40 0.22 0.05 0.77 B > 0  or 
B < 0 
Relative value 
added of foreign-
owned firms 
75 0.44 0.23 0.05 0.84 B > 0  or 
B < 0 
Technology variables 
R&D/output 75 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.28 B > 0  or 
B < 0 
(Patents* 
mia)/output 
75 0.40 0.22 0.05 0.77 B > 0  or 
B < 0 
% change in TFP 75 0.44 0.23 0.05 0.84 B > 0  or 
B < 0 
Control variables 
Unemployment 
rate 
75 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.34 B < 0 
C5- concentration 
ratio 
75 0.34 0.17 
 
0.12 0.77 B > 0  or 
B < 0 
Capacity 
utilisation(b) 
70 0.77 0.03 
 
0.70 0.86 B > 0 
(a) These data were only available for the years 1991 and 1995. 
(b) Sector 49 of the NACE-70 was dropped because of data limitations. 
Source: Own computation based on data described in Appendix B. 
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Table 9   Second stage regression results: determinants of the workers’ relative bargaining    
power 
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Effect on 
bargaining 
power 
No controls Industry 
fixed effects 
Time fixed 
effects 
Industry & 
time fixed 
effects 
Number of 
observations 
Trade variables 
Import/production B < 0 -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
75 
Export/production B > 0 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
75 
Outsourcing 
narrow(a) 
B < 0 0.05 
(0.08) 
0.20 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
30 
Outsourcing broad B < 0 -0.05 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
30 
Tariffs B > 0 0.55*** 
(0.16) 
1.57* 
(0.80) 
0.50 
(0.10) 
1.10 
(1.78) 
30 
Inward foreign direct investment variables 
Relative number of 
foreign-owned 
firms 
B > 0  or 
B < 0 
0.15 
(0.09) 
-1.83** 
(0.77) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
-2.29*** 
(0.85) 
75 
Relative 
employment of 
foreign-owned 
firms 
B > 0  or 
B < 0 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.43) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.43) 
75 
Relative value 
added of foreign-
owned firms 
B > 0  or 
B < 0 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.12 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.15 
(0.22) 
75 
Technology variables 
R&D/output B > 0  or 
B < 0 
0.95*** 
(0.32) 
 
4.73* 
(2.76) 
0.97*** 
(0.30) 
7.73* 
(4.14) 
75 
(Patents* 
mia)/output 
B > 0  or 
B < 0 
-0.23** 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.22** 
(0.10) 
-0.09 
(0.13) 
75 
% change in TFP B > 0  or 
B < 0 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
75 
Control variables 
Unemployment rate B < 0 0.14* 
(1.93) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(0.22) 
75 
C5- concentration 
ratio 
B > 0  or 
B < 0 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
75 
Capacity 
utilisation(b) 
B > 0 -0.22** 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
-0.27** 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
70 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(a) These data were only available for the years 1991 and 1995. 
(b) Sector 49 of the NACE-70 was dropped because of data limitations. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1 .  Sectoral classification for the first stage regressions 
 
 Sector NACE-70  NACE-Bel 
Sec 1 Food, beverages and tobacco 
41+42 15+16 
Sec 2 Textiles 43 17 
Sec 3  Wearing apparel and leather and products 
44+45 18+19 
Sec 4 Wood products and furniture and fixtures 
46 20 + 36.1 
Sec 5 Manufacture of pulp, paper and board 
471+472 21 
Sec 6 Printing and allied industries 
473+474 22 
Sec 7 Chemical industry and man-made fibres 
25+26 24 
Sec 8 Rubber and plastic products 
48 25 
Sec 9 Non-metallic mineral products 
24 26 
Sec 10 Basic metal industries 22 27 
Sec 11 Metal products 31 28 
Sec 12 Non-electrical machinery 32 29 
Sec 13 
Office and computing 
machinery, electrical 
machinery and 
professional goods 
33+34+37 30-33 
Sec 14 Other transport equipment 35+36 34+35 
Sec 15 Other manufacturing 49 36-36.1 
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Appendix B 
 
The sectoral classification for the second stage regressions is based on Table A.1 of Appendix 
A and covers the period 1991-1995, except for the tariff data and the outsourcing variables.  
The data for the trade variables are obtained from the OECD International Trade by 
Commodities Statistics (ITCS). These data are in the Standard Industrial Trade Classification 
(SITC) and are converted to the NACE-70 classification with a correspondence table obtained 
from the OECD. 24 The production data are obtained from the OECD (1999) Stan Database 
for Industrial Analysis.  Our narrow and broad outsourcing variables are derived from the 
1990 and 1995 input-output tables for the Belgian economy.25 The data for 1990 are in the 
NACE-clio classification for which a conversion was used, while the data for 1995 are in the 
NACE-bel classification (see Table A. of Appendix A for a conversion to the NACE-70 
classification).  The tariff data are based on Messerlin (2001) and refer to the average Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs of the European Union. These tariff data cover the years 1990 
and 1995. Also, for some sectors the data are more disaggregated than the sectoral 
classification of Table A.1.. Hence, we used sectoral import shares as a weight to construct 
tariff data based on the classification based on this table. 
Regarding inward foreign direct investment, we experimented with three variables: the 
number of foreign-owned companies relative to the total number of companies, the total 
employment of foreign-owned firms relative to the total Belgian employment and the total 
value added of foreign-owned firms relative to the total Belgian value added for each 
manufacturing sector. The Belgian Federal Planning gathers data on all multinationals firms 
in the Belgian economy. A multinational firm is defined as a firm that is at least 50% foreign-
owned and is in contrast to the literature which applies a 10% threshold (see De Backer, 2002, 
and De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003, for a further description of this data set).  
We experiment with three technology variables. We use the sectoral R&D intensity, 
which is defined as R&D expenditures divided by output as a measure for innovative input. 
The R&D data are obtained from the Dienst voor Wetenschappelijke, Technische en Culturele 
Aangelegenheden (DWTC, Belgian Federal Science Policy Office). 26 For the years 1990 and 
1991, missing observations are filled in with the aid of a spline interpolation technique. The 
data are in the NACE-Bel classification and are converted to the NACE-70 classification 
                                                
24 The data were first converted through the International Industrial Classification (ISIC) and subsequently 
converted to the NACE-70 based on Schumacher (1992).  
25 See http:/ / www.plan.be/ . 
26 See http:/ / www.belspo.be/  
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based on NIS (1997). The production data are obtained from the OECD (1999) Stan Database 
for Industrial Analysis.  We also experiment with granted patent data that are a measure of 
innovative output. These patent data are obtained from the EPO (European Patent Office) and 
are converted to the NACE-70 classification based on the conversion table of Verspagen et al. 
(1994).27 The patent variable used is patents divided by production times milliards. A third 
technology variable is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) that reflects a measure of productivity. 
This variable is expressed into indices where 1990 is the base year. The percentage change of 
the total factor productivity can be expressed as follows:  
( ) ( )LKLQA ˆˆˆˆˆ −−−= α      (B.1.) 
 In this expression, the first term refers to the percentage change in the output labour 
ratio. In the second term, α  refers to the capital share in production. Therefore, ( )α−1  refers 
to the labour share in production, which is calculated as the average share of labour costs in 
value added. ( )LK ˆˆ −  refers to the percentage change in the capital-labour ratio. We 
constructed our capital stock data starting from real investment data from the OECD (1999) 
Stan Database for Industrial Analysis and using a perpetual inventory method following 
Griliches (1979).28 We first compute an initial capital stock for 1990. If we assume that both 
the depreciation rate ( )δ  and the annual growth rate ( )η  of investments prior to 1990 are 
constant, the initial capital stock 1990K  equals: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 199033199022199019901990 111 IIIIK λδλδλδ −+−+−+=    (B.2) 
           ( )



−−
= δλ 11
1
1990I  
where ( )ηλ += 11 . The growth rate η  is estimated as the mean annual growth rate of 
investments over the period 1985-1990. Like Maskus (1991), we use a depreciation rate of 
13.33 percent. After having obtained the initial capital stock, deflated investment series are 
accumulated and depreciated from 1990 onwards. The deflators are calculated from the value 
added series in the OECD (1999) Stan database.  
 
The sectoral unemployment rate is a first control variable and is obtained from the Rijksdienst 
voor Arbeidsvoorziening (RVA).  Another variable is the C5- concentration ratio which refers 
                                                
27 Again, the conversion has occurred through the ISIC-classification.  
28 A more complete description of how the capital series are constructed is available from the authors 
upon request.  
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to the five-firm concentration ratio and is computed with the aid from the Belgian National 
Bank Balance sheet data using the sales variable. As a last control variable, we use the 
capacity utilisation rate, which is obtained from the Belgostat database of the Belgian 
National Bank.29  These data are provided quarterly and are disaggregated according different 
sectors in the manufacturing sector that is more disaggregated for some sectors of Table X. 
First, we compute the average utilisation rate in each sector30. Some sectors are aggregated up 
using the value of production as weights. The sector “Other Manufacturing” (sector 49 of the 
NACE-70) was lacking so we therefore did not use this sector in our estimations.  
                                                
29 These data can be downloaded from http:/ / www.nbb.be/ belgostat/ . 
30 Doing this, we also filter out seasonal fluctuations when we take averages. Another option would be to 
use a filtering technique such as the Census X-11 method. 
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